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Abstract
The Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved great
success on a variety of computer vision tasks, however, they
are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. To address this
problem, we propose to improve the local smoothness of the
representation space, by integrating a margin-based triplet
embedding regularization term into the classification objec-
tive, so that the obtained model learns to resist adversarial
examples. The regularization term consists of two steps op-
timizations which find potential perturbations and punish
them by a large margin in an iterative way. Experimen-
tal results on MNIST, CASIA-WebFace, VGGFace2 andMS-
Celeb-1M reveal that our approach increases the robustness
of the network against both feature and label adversarial
attacks in simple object classification and deep face recog-
nition.The code is available at https://github.com/
zhongyy/Adversarial_MTER
1. Introduction
The Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved great
success [20, 38, 15, 17], significantly improving the devel-
opment of a variety of challenging applications such as deep
face recognition [7, 36, 47, 25, 45, 9, 46, 24] and automatic
driving [3, 8].
However, contradictions between the vulnerability of
DNNs and the demand of security have become increas-
ingly obvious. On one hand, DNNs are vulnerable. Previ-
ous works have discovered, with elaborate strategies, DNNs
can be easily fooled by test images with imperceptible
noise [42]. This type of images is named as adversarial
examples. Moreover, adversarial examples are transferable
in different models [31, 10], which means black-box at-
tacks can be launched without knowing the details of target
models (e.g. architectures, parameters and defense meth-
ods). On the other hand, the demand of security arises in
safety crucial domains driven by DNNs. Adversarial exam-
ples can attack physical-world DNNs applications [21]. For
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instance, DNNs in an automatic vehicle system can be con-
fused by carefully manipulated road signs [12], and DNNs
in a face recognition system are susceptible to feature level
adversarial attacks [35, 1, 39].
The existence of adversarial examples has given birth
to a variety of researches on adversarial defenses. One
straightforward defense strategy is to increase the robust-
ness of the model by injecting adversarial examples in the
training process [42, 22, 44], which is essentially a regular-
ization of the training data augmentation. This strategy is
effective in close-set classification like object classification,
while may not suitable in open-set settings like deep face
recognition where training categories could be in million
level. Another strategy is to detect adversarial examples at
inference time [27, 50, 39]. This strategy is appropriate for
both open-set and close-set classification settings, while it
can be easily broken in the white-box setting where the spe-
cific defense method is known [5].
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the defense before MTER train-
ing (top) versus after training (bottom). Arrows indicate the gradi-
ents arising from the optimization of the cost function. The same
color represents the same predict class.
In this paper, we propose a margin-based triplet embed-
ding regularization (MTER) method to train DNNs with ro-
bustness. Our intuition is that by training a model to im-
prove the local smoothness of embedding space with fewer
singular points, it will be more resistant to adversarial ex-
amples. The regularization term consists of two steps opti-
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mizations in an iterative way which first find potential per-
turbations in the embedding space, and then punish them
by a large margin. A schematic illustration of the defense
before MTER versus after MTER is shown in Figure 1.
Specifically, in the embedding space, a potential attack is
generated from a source to a target. We improve the ro-
bustness by encouraging the hypothetical attacks to gradu-
ally approach the source class, meanwhile move far away
from all the other target classes. The result of an embed-
ding space visualization experiment is shown in Figure 2.
In the optimization, the large margin is not trivial, which
strictly ensures the inter-class distance and the intra-class
smoothness in the embedding space. Our contributions are
as follows:
1. We propose to improve the robustness of DNNs by
smoothing the embedding space, which is appropriate for
DNNs trained in both open-set and close-set classification
settings.
2. We introduce the large margin into adversarial learn-
ing, which further guarantees the inter-class distance and
the intra-class smoothness in the embedding space, there-
fore improves the robustness of DNNs.
3. Experimental results on MNIST [51], CASIA-
WebFace [54], VGGFace2 [4] and MS-Celeb-1M [53]
demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in simple ob-
ject classification and deep face recognition.
2. Related work
2.1. Adversarial attacks
Szegedy et al. [42] first find that they can cause DNNs
to misclassify images by a certain hardly perceptible pertur-
bation which is generated using a box-constrained L-BFGS
method. Compared with the L-BFGS attack [42], Good-
fellow et al. [14] propose a more time-saving and practical
method ”fast“ method (FGSM) to generate adversarial ex-
amples by performing one-step gradient update along the
direction of the sign of gradient at each pixel.
Kurakin et al. [21] introduce a straightforward method
called ”basic iterative“ method (BIM), to extend the ”fast“
method (FGSM) [14] by applying it multiple times with
small step size and clip pixel values after each step to ensure
the L∞ constraint. Moreover, to generate adversarial exam-
ples of a specific desired target class, Kurakin et al. [21] in-
troduce the iterative least likely method. Iterative methods
could attacks DNNs with higher rate compared with the fast
method in the same constraint level [21]. Similarly, another
iterative attack method proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. [29], called Deepfool, is also reliable and efficient. With
linear approximation, Deepfool try to generate the minimal
perturbation in each step by moving towards the lineared
decision boundary [29]. Based on Deepfool [29], Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [28] propose image-agnostic adversarial at-
tacks, which could fool DNNs with a universal perturbation
on images with high probability.
Apart from the generation of adversarial examples, there
are also works focus on the transferability of adversarial
examples [31, 10, 49], adversarial examples in physical
world [21, 12], and in specific tasks such as face recogni-
tion system [37, 13].
2.2. Defense methods
The defense methods can be classified into two cate-
gories, one is to improve the robustness of DNNs, the
other one is to detect adversarial examples at inference
time [27, 50, 39]. We mainly discuss the former type, which
is more related to our work.
Network distillation [2, 16] is originally proposed to re-
duce the model size. Papernot et al. [32] introduce distilla-
tion as a defense method to improve the robustness by feed-
ing back the class probability to train the original model.
Adversarial training could provide regularization to
DNNs [14]. Goodfellow et al. [14] first propose adversar-
ial training which could increase the robustness by injecting
adversarial examples in the training process. Then adversar-
ial training is applied and analyzed in large training dataset
ImageNet [22].
Although the success of adversarial training on white-
box defenses, the defense against black-box attacks is still a
problem, due to the transferability of adversarial examples.
To deal with the transferred black-box attacks, Tramer et
al. [44] introduce ensemble adversarial training technique
transferring one-step adversarial examples from other train-
ing models, while Na et al. [30] propose cascade adversar-
ial trained transferring iterative attacks from already trained
model.
Around the same time, Dong et al. [11] and Na et al. [30]
minimize both the cross-entropy loss and the distance of
original and adversarial embedding to improve the vanilla
adversarial training. They are the most related work to ours.
However, our method mainly differs from them in two as-
pects: (1) Our MTER method is a straightforward and thor-
ough feature adversary which will not be limited by number
of training categories, therefore is also appropriate for open-
set classification. (2) We introduce the large margin into ad-
versarial learning, which guarantees not only the intra-class
smoothness but also the inter-class distance in the embed-
ding space.
3. Margin-based Regularization
Our purpose is training a DNN to have smooth represen-
tations with fewer singular points. Therefore we consider
a regularization term which exploits the vulnerability and
further fix them in an iterative way.
Algorithm 1 Margin-based triplet embedding regulariza-
tion (MTER)
Input:
Training set D = {x(i), y(i) ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}}, model pa-
rameter θ and hyperparametermarginm, mini-batch size
K .
Output:
The final model parameter θ.
Initialization at the beginning of an epoch:
// Constructing the source images queueQs and the Qt.
Qs=Qt={}.
Random select C2 categories in {1, 2, ..., C} denoted as
source S, the complementary set is target T .
Qs.append({xi|yi ∈ S});Qt.append({xi|yi ∈ T }).
shuffleQs andQt.
Optimization in an epoch:
while Qt is not empty and Qs is not empty do
Take out a mini-batch Bs and Bt with K2 samples re-
spectively in Qs and in Qt.
∆x(s,t) ← Calculate perturbations (3) in an iterative
way (5) on the batch Bs and Bt, based on the current
model θ.
θ ← ∇(Lori (2)+ RMTER (10)) on batch Bs, Bt and
∆x(s,t).
end while
3.1. Exploitation the Vulnerability
First we consider the vulnerability exploitation. We start
from some notations. LetD = {x(i), y(i)} denote a labeled
dataset where x(i) and y(i) ∈ {1, 2, ..., C} respectively de-
note an input image and the corresponding label. A DNN
can be formulated in a chain
Fθ
(n)(x) = f (n)(...(f (2)(f (1)(x))), (1)
parameterized by θ. The network is originally trained on a
datasetD by cross entropy
Lori=argmin
θ
H(Fθ
(n)(x(i)), y(i))=−
1
K
K∑
i=1
log p(y(i)|x(i)),
(2)
whereH giving the sum of the cross entropies between the
predictions Fθ
(n)(x(i)) and the labels y(i).
Given a trained DNN, a source image and a target im-
age, denoted as {x(s), x(t)}, where y(s) 6= y(t), we could
find small perturbations ∆x(s,t) to the source image x(s)
that produce an internal representation that is remarkably
similar to that of the target image x(t) [35]. The vulnerabil-
ity exploitation in embedding space can be described as:
∆x(s,t) = argmin
∆x(s,t)
∥∥∥E(x(s) +∆x(s,t))− E(x(t))
∥∥∥
2
2
, (3)
subject to ∥
∥
∥∆x(s,t)
∥
∥
∥
∞
< ε. (4)
E(x) is the deep representation in the embedding space,
which is normalized to unit length from Fθ
(n−1)(x).
Fθ
(n−1)(x) is the function from the image x to its repre-
sentation at the n−1 layer. ε limits the maximum deviation
of the perturbation.
For computational efficiency, we adopt the direction de-
fined by the gradient of the metric loss function and form
adversarial perturbations in an iterative way, referred to as
iterative feature target gradient sign method (IFTGSM):
∆x
(s,t)
0 = 0,
x
(s) +∆x
(s,t)
N+1 = Cx(s),ε(x
(s) +∆x
(s,t)
N +
sign(∇
x(s)+∆x
(s,t)
N
∥∥∥E(x(s) +∆x(s,t)N )−E(x
(t))
∥∥∥
2
2
)),
(5)
where
Cx,ε(x
′) = min(255, x+ ε,max(0, x− ε, x′)), (6)
the iteration is chosen heuristically min(ε + 4, 1.25ε).
∆x(s,t) can also be generated using a fast method, referred
to as fast feature target gradient sign method (FFTGSM).
We formulate it as follows:
∆x(s,t) = εsign(∇x(s)
∥
∥
∥E(x(s))− E(x(t))
∥
∥
∥
2
2
)). (7)
We will use this fast attack method in the experiment on
face recognition in Section 4.5.
3.2. Fix the Vulnerability
Our target is to improve the robustness of DNNs without
modifying their architectures. The aforementioned vulner-
ability attacks a DNN by finding singular points in the in-
ternal representation space of a DNN. Considering the ex-
istence of the vulnerability, we find it is possible that we
smooth the embedding space by jointly optimizing the orig-
inal cross entropy and a large-margin based triplet distance
constraint as a regularization term.
With a source and a target image {x(s), x(t)}, consider a
triplet t := {E(x(s)), E(x(s) +∆x(s,t)), E(x(t))}, where
∆x(s,t) is the aforementioned perturbation. Ideally, for all
triplets t which are generated in the training set, we would
like the following constraint to be satisfied:
∥∥∥E(x(s)+∆x(s,t))−E(x(s))
∥∥∥
2
2
<
∥∥∥E(x(s)+∆x(s,t))−E(x(t))
∥∥∥
2
2
.
(8)
However, due to the first step optimization in objective (3),
the actual situation at a certain moment in the training pro-
cess may be:
∥∥∥E(x(s)+∆x(s,t))−E(x(s))
∥∥∥
2
2
>
∥∥∥E(x(s)+∆x(s,t))−E(x(t))
∥∥∥
2
2
.
(9)
Therefore, the vulnerability exploitation and fixing to-
gether constitute two optimization steps in the adversarial
learning, which strive to attack each other but also together
improve the robustness of DNNs gradually. Formally, we
define the margin-based triplet embedding regularization
(MTER) as follows:
RMTER=
1
K
∑
y(s) 6=y(t)
max(0,m+
∥∥∥E(x(s)+∆x(s,t))−E(x(s))
∥∥∥
2
2
−
∥∥∥E(x(s)+∆x(s,t))−E(x(t))
∥∥∥
2
2
),
(10)
where the∆x(s,t) is obtained and upgraded by objective (3),
and the parameter m is the margin. In practice, we apply
the vulnerability exploitation and fixing in an iterative way,
which is precisely described in Algorithm 1. Parameter m
controls that the similarity between the source image and
the perturbed image should be much higher than that be-
tween the perturbed image and the target image. m is cho-
sen based on the training dataset and the model capacity.
We will discuss the parameter m in the following ablation
study in Section 4.3.
4. Experiment
4.1. Experiment on Simple Image Classification
In this section, we first analyze the effect of the margin-
based triplet embedding regularization (MTER) method on
MNIST [51], a simple image classification task. We train
ResNet [15] models using original training loss functions,
adversarial training, and our MTER method, respectively.
We test different models assuming that the adversary knows
the classification algorithm, model architecture and param-
eters, because the reliability of a model could be demon-
strated if a model is robust in the white-box setting.
We first give a brief description of the adversarial train-
ing method [22] and attack methods FGSM [14], BIM [21],
FTGSM [21], ITGSM [21] which we will test and compare
with our method.
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [14] generates adver-
sarial examples by perturbing inputs in a manner that in-
creases the sign of the gradients of the original loss function
w.r.t. the input image x(i):
x
(i)
adv = x
(i) + εsign(∇x(i)H(Fθ
(n)(x(i)), y(i))), (11)
where H giving the cross entropy between the predictions
Fθ
(n)(x(i)) and the labels y(i), ε limits the maximum devi-
ation of the perturbation.
Basic iterative method (BIM) [21] is a modification of
the FGSM [14] by applying it multiple times:
x
(i)
adv,0 = x
(i), x
(i)
adv,N+1 =
Cx(i),ε(x
(i)
adv,N + αsign(∇x(i)
adv,N
H(Fθ
(n)(x
(i)
adv,N ), y
(i)))),
(12)
where α = 1 is used, Cx(i),ε is referred to as equation (6),
and number of iterations ismin(ε+ 4, 1.25ε).
Compared with BIM [21], iterative target gradient sign
method (ITGSM) [21] leads the model to misclassify an im-
age as another target category:
x
(i)
adv,0 = x
(i), x
(i)
adv,N+1 =
Cx(i),ε(x
(i)
adv,N − αsign(∇x(i)
adv,N
H(Fθ
(n)(x
(i)
adv,N ), y
(i)
t ))),
(13)
where y
(i)
t is the target label we would like the model to
predict, y
(i)
t 6= y
(i). Also, the target attack can be launched
in a Fast style, referred to as fast target gradient sign method
(FTGSM) [21]:
x
(i)
adv = x
(i) − εsign(∇x(i)H(Fθ
(n)(x(i)), y
(i)
t )). (14)
We use ResNet-18 [15] for training. The models are
trained from scratch. There is no data augmentation for both
datasets. ε = 0.3 ∗ 255 is applied for MNIST [51]. In IT-
GSM [21] attack, the least likely class is used as the target
class. We use two type of original loss functions Softmax
and ArcFace [9], which is a type of large-margin loss and
first used in deep face recognition. The feature scale is set
to 10 and angular margin is set to 0.4 in ArcFace [9]. We
improve the robustness of the two type of original loss re-
spectively using adversarial training [22] and our method.
The margin m in our MTER method is set to 0.2. We
follow the adversarial training implemented in Kurakin et
al. [22], which increases the robustness by replacing half of
the mini-batch clean examples with their adversarial exam-
ples into the training process. More specifically, we gen-
erate adversarial examples using FGSM [14] perturbations
with respect to predicted rather than true labels following
works [30, 34], to prevent ”label leaking“ [22] where the
model tend to learn to classify adversarial examples more
accurately than regular examples. The relative weight of
adversarial examples in the loss is set to 0.3 following [22].
The results are shown in Table 1. As shown in the table,
even though adversarial training is done with the predicted
label, the label leaking phenomenon [22] still happens.
Our MTER method improves the robustness of the origi-
nal models using different loss functions under FGSM [14],
BIM [21] and ITGSM [21] attacks. For models trained with
Softmax, our method sacrifices a little performance on the
clean images. while for models trained with ArcFace [9],
a large margin loss function, it even improves the accuracy
on clean images. Besides, it outperforms adversarial train-
ing method under BIM [21] and ITGSM [21] attacks. Even
though we did not use these type of adversarial examples
for data augmentation in training like adversarial training
method, our method could still gain robust improvements
under unknown attacks. This indicates that our method can
improve the robustness of models on simple image classifi-
cation like MNIST [51].
Method Clean FGSM [14] BIM [21] ITGSM [21]
Softmax loss 99.6 10.4 0.0 6.0
Adversarial training 99.6 99.9 3.1 47.2
Softmax+MTER (ours) 99.5 96.8 98.7 95.1
ArcFace Loss 99.5 28.6 1.7 24.7
Adversarial training 99.5 99.5 30.5 71.3
ArcFace Loss+MTER (ours) 99.6 96.6 98.0 95.3
Table 1. MNIST [51] test results (%) for Resnet-18 [15] models
(ε = 0.3 ∗ 255 at test time). The higher the accuracy is, the more
robust is the target model.
4.2. Embedding Space Visualization
MNIST [51], the popular and sweet dataset is used for
embedding space visualization. We use the ResNet-18 [15]
by changing the original fully connected layer to two fully
connected layer and then modifying the embedding dimen-
sion to 2. We retrain networks on MNIST [51] with Soft-
max and Softmax combined our MTER method, respec-
tively. Then we use the clean examples of test dataset for
visualization. Besides, for each class, we randomly choose
a test sample and generate adversarial examples of it using
BIM [21] for visualization.
The results are shown in Figure 2. The round represents
the clean examples of MNIST [51] test set. The triangle
represents BIM [21] adversarial examples, which we draw
from ε = 0 to ε = 76(≈ 0.3 × 255) for one sample im-
age per each class. We can observe that with our MTER
method, the adversarial examples are close to clean exam-
ples and distributed in the original class region in the em-
bedding space. The inter-class margin is enlarged and the
intra-class smoothness is improved, which guarantee the ro-
bustness of the model.
Figure 2. Embedding space visualization on ResNet-18 [15] which
is modified embedding dimension to 2. Models are trained on
MNIST [51] with Softmax and Softmax combined with MTER
method, respectively. The round represents the clean examples of
MNIST [51] test set. The triangle represents BIM [21] adversarial
examples, which we draw from ε = 0 to ε = 76(≈ 0.3 × 255)
for one sample image per each class.
4.3. Analysis on Margin m
We useMNIST [51] to conduct adversarial study [42, 14,
30, 52], to further analyze our MTERmethod. The only hy-
perparameter in our method is the marginm. So we would
like to explore the influence ofm and give advice on choice
of it under different settings.
First we train LeNet-5 [23] and ResNet-18 [15] by
varying m in {0.2, 0.45, 0.7, 0.95, 1.2, 1.4}. Then we test
these models using aforementioned attack methods, i.e.
FGSM [14], BIM [21] and ITGSM [21]. The results are
illustrated in Figure 3, from which we can discover signif-
icant difference between the two type of models, LeNet-
5 [23] and ResNet-18 [15]. Although the two type of mod-
els both could obtain good test accuracy on MNIST [51],
the accuracy for LeNet-5 [23] and ResNet-18 [15] is 99.2%
and 99.6% respectively. However, for LeNet-5 [23], along
with the increase of margin m, the robustness to different
attacks improves gradually and the accuracy on clean im-
ages decreases slightly. While for ResNet-18 [15], both the
accuracy on clean test set and the robustness against adver-
sarial attacks, have reached a relative high level and remain
unchanged when the margin increases.
Figure 3. LeNet-5 [23] and ResNet-18 [15] trained using MTER
by varying margin m in {0.2, 0.45, 0.7, 0.95, 1.2, 1.4}. The
two type of models both could obtain good test accuracy on
MNIST [51]. However, for LeNet-5 [23], along with the increase
of margin m, the robustness to attacks improves gradually. While
for ResNet-18 [15], the robustness has reached a relative high level
and remains unchanged when the margin increases.
Furthermore, we fix the margin m = 0.2. We use this
relative small margin because we would like to observe
the performance of different networks under relaxed state
of our method. We train models under Softmax and our
MTER method respectively, using different architectures,
e.g. LeNet-5 [23], ResNet-6 [15], ResNet-8 [15], ResNet-
10 [15], ResNet-18 [15], ResNet-34 [15] and ResNet-
50 [15]. We still test these trained models under the three
aforementioned attacks. The results are shown in Figure 4.
In the figure 4, for models trained using Softmax, the ac-
curacy on the clean images increases when the model size
becomes bigger (from LeNet-5 [23] to ResNet-50 [15]).
For models trained using Softmax combined with MTER
(m = 0.2), the accuracy on the clean images and three ad-
versarial examples increases when the model size becomes
bigger (from LeNet-5 [23] to ResNet-10 [15]), while remain
relatively stable when the model size reaches a certain value
Figure 4. Accuracy on clean images, and adversarial examples
generated by FGSM [14], BIM [21], and ITGSM [21] of models
with different architectures. “L5”,“R6”,“R8”,“R10”,“R18”,“34”
and “R50” on the x-axis denote LeNet-5 [23], ResNet-6 [15],
ResNet-8 [15], ResNet-10 [15], ResNet-18 [15], ResNet-34 [15]
and ResNet-50 [15]. For models trained using Softmax combined
withMTER(m = 0.2), the accuracy on the clean images and three
adversarial examples increases when the model size becomes big-
ger (from LeNet-5 [23] to ResNet-10 [15]), while remain relatively
stable when the model size reaches a certain value (after ResNet-
10 [15])
(after ResNet-10 [15]).
We then infer that a specific classification task need a
certain amount of computing power to fit the clean set and
its augmentation set, e.g. adversarial examples. It is easy for
our method to push a largemodel to learn both the clean im-
ages and the adversarial examples under a relative relaxed
state (small m), while it will not work for a relative small
model with less computing power. Therefore we recom-
mend to increase the margin m to push the “lazy” model
fighting with adversarial examples but sacrificing a little
performance on the original dataset, if a small model is used
and is still concerned about robustness.
4.4. Black-box Attack Analysis
We also use MNIST [51] for analysis of adversarial at-
tacks and defense under black-box settings. We report black
box attack accuracy of the adversarial examples generated
from a source network and tested on another target network.
In our experiment, both the source network and the tar-
get network are trained with adversarial learning methods
in different architectures. Specifically, we use four mod-
els, the architecture of them are LeNet-5 [23] or ResNet-
18 [15], and training methods are adversarial training [22]
or our MTER method. The adversarial examples from the
source models are generated by FGSM [14] or BIM [21]
with ε = 0.3 ∗ 255.
The results on FGSM [14] and BIM [21] are shown in
Source
Target
ADV-L5 MTER-L5 ADV-R18 MTER-R18
ADV-L5 92.0 95.6 97.3
MTER-L5 85.3 94.5 97.7
ADV-R18 89.8 94.9 97.4
MTER-R18 45.2 94.2 94.1
Table 2. MNIST [51] test result (%) on FGSM [14] (ε = 0.3 ∗
255) adversarial examples under black box settings. The row and
the column denote the source and target model respectively. The
LeNet-5 [23] is denoted as ”L5“, and ResNet-18 [15] is denoted
as ”R18“. ”ADV“ is a shorthand of adversarial training [22]. The
higher the accuracy is, the more robust is the target model.
Source
Target
ADV-L5 MTER-L5 ADV-R18 MTER-R18
ADV-L5 90.1 89.1 97.3
MTER-L5 79.3 92.8 97.5
ADV-R18 88.2 94.9 97.3
MTER-R18 84.0 94.6 95.6
Table 3. MNIST [51] test result (%) on BIM [21] (ε = 0.3 ∗ 255)
adversarial examples under black box settings. The row and the
column denote the source and target model respectively. The
LeNet-5 [23] is denoted as ”L5“, and ResNet-18 [15] is denoted
as ”R18“. ”ADV“ is a shorthand of adversarial training [22]. The
higher the accuracy is, the more robust is the target model.
Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. The row and the column
denote the source and targetmodel respectively. The LeNet-
5 [23] is denoted as ”L5“, and ResNet-18 [15] is denoted as
”R18“. ”ADV“ is a shorthand of adversarial training [22].
”MTER-R18“ means this ResNet-18 [15] model is trained
supervised by Softmax combined with our MTER method.
The higher the accuracy is, the more robust is the target
model.
As shown in the Table 2 and Table 3, if the source mod-
els and the architecture of targets models are both equal, the
accuracy of target models trained using MTER method is
higher than that of adversarial training method [22]. This
phenomenon indicates our MTER method show better ro-
bust performance under black box attack scenario, on both
FGSM [14] and BIM [21] adversarial examples, even if
the adversarial training have used FGSM [14] examples for
augmentation. Besides, we find that the ResNet-18 [15]
models are more robust than LeNet-5 [23] models, while
adversarial examples generated from LeNet-5 [23] are more
aggressive and have better transferability than those of
ResNet-18 [15].
4.5. Experiment on Deep Face Recognition
In a deep face recognition system, an adversary may try
to disguise a face as an authorized user. We simulate this
scenario using state-of-art face recognition models and test
our MTER method. Deep face recognition is a open-set
problem, which indicates the training identities and the test
identities are usually different. We don’t directly classify an
identity by end-to-end classification probability, but use a
DNN as a deep feature extracter and compare deep features
to distinguish faces.
Training datasets. In the experiment, the training
datasets are CASIA-WebFace [54], VGGFace2 [4] and
MS1M-IBUG [53]. The CASIA-WebFace [54] dataset is
the first widely used large-scale training dataset in deep
face recognition, containing 0.49M images from 10,575
celebrities. VGGFace2 [4] is a large-scale dataset contain-
ing 3.31M images from 9131 celebrities. There are diverse
and abundant images in VGGFace2 [4], which have large
variations in pose, age, illumination, ethnicity and profes-
sion. MS1M-IBUG [53] (referred to as MS1M [53]) is
a refined version of MS-Celeb-1M dataset [53], which is
public available and widely used. The original MS-Celeb-
1M dataset [53] contains about 10k celebrities with 10M
images. MS1M [53] is refined by Deng et al. [9] to de-
crease the noise and finally contains 3.8M images of 85,164
celebrities.
Network settings. For all the embedding networks, we
adopt the ResNet-50 [15], but make changes as [9] which
apply the “BN [19]-Dropout [40]-FC-BN” sturcture to get
the final 512-D embedding feature. For image preprocess-
ing, the images are cropped and aligned to the normalized
112 × 112 face following [9]. In the training process, the
original models are supervised by an effective loss func-
tion ArcFace [9], which has been widely accepted by indus-
try. The feature scale is set to 64 and angular margin is set
to 0.5 for CASIA-WebFace [54] and MS1M [53], and 0.3
for VGGFace2 [4] following the original paper [9]. Differ-
ent from the object classification experiment, the face mod-
els are finetuned with ArcFace combined with our MTER
method. The face models finetuned with MTER method
have fine convergence speed and usually converge in no
more than 3 epoches. We set m to 0.2, 1.2 and 1.4 for
CASIA-WebFace [54], VGGFace2 [4] and MS1M [53], re-
spectively.
Figure 5. The first row is the five target identities, the second row
is five attackers which are randomly selected in all the 13233 at-
tackers.
Recognition performance. We test the recognition per-
formance of all the models on LFW [18] and YTF [48].
LFW [18] contains 13233 face images from 5749 differ-
ent identities. We follow the unrestricted with labeled out-
side data protocol on LFW [18] and test on the 3000 pos-
itive (same identity) and 3000 (different identity) negative
Figure 6. ROC curves of different models on LFW [18]. We define
the distance threshold of a network for attacking (or distinguishing
a positive and a negative pair) to have a low false accept rate (FAR
= 1e− 3) on LFW.
pairs. YTF [48] is a database of face video collected from
YouTube, which consists of 3,425 videos of 1,595 different
people. Each video varies from 48 to 6,070 frames, with an
average length as 181.3 frames. We follow the unrestricted
with labeled outside data protocol on all the test datasets.
Robustness performance. To simulate the face disguise
scenario, we select five person as target identities, as shown
in the first row of Figure 5. Then we use the 13233 face im-
ages in LFW [18] as attackers to disguise another five tar-
get person respectively, which construct a 13233× 5 attack
matrix to simulate random attacks. We test the robustness
under two attack settings:(1) feature attacks and (2) label
attacks. The feature attack is more practical in face recog-
nition, while we use the label attack for demonstrating the
effectiveness of our method in label defense of close-set set-
tings which is a rarity in deep face recognition.
First we define the feature attacks settings. The attacks
are launched from attackers to disguise targets. Specifically,
the attack goal is to get face embedding representations of
attackers closer to those of targets than the distance thresh-
old of a face recognition system. Next, we define the thresh-
old of a DNN in our simulation. Using positive and nega-
tive pairs of LFW [18], we compute the Euclidean distance
of normalized deep features to get ROC curves, as shown in
Figure 6. Then we identify distance thresholds for judging a
pair is positive or negative. Since we would like to compare
the adversarial robustness of the trained models like real-
world applications, we define the distance threshold for at-
tacking (or distinguishing a positive and a negative pair) to
have a low false accept rate (FAR = 1e− 3). We will gener-
ate attacks (3) using IFTGSM (5) and FFTGSM (7). Then
we define the evaluation criteria to measure the robustness
of models. The attack goal is to get face embedding rep-
resentations of attackers closer to those of targets than the
Euclidean distance threshold. The defense goal is to keep
the distance between the representations of attackers and
targets larger than the threshold. Therefore, an attack is de-
fined as a hit if the embedding distance between the attacker
and target is lower than the threshold. We use the average
hit rate of the five targets to report the robustness perfor-
mance of the trained models. The lower is the average hit
rate, the stronger is robustness of the model.
Training Method Training Set FFTGSM(ε=10) IFTGSM(ε=5) IFTGSM(ε=10) ITGSM [21](ε=10) LFW YTF
ArcFace [9] CASIA-WebFace [54] 99.3 100.0 100.0 98.3 99.5 95.6
ArcFace [9]+adv. CASIA-WebFace [54] 5.1 (↓ 94.2) 5.7 (↓ 94.3) 49.5 (↓ 50.5) 0.8 (↓ 97.5) 99.4 94.7
ArcFace [9]+MTER CASIA-WebFace [54] 2.0 (↓ 97.3) 3.5 (↓ 96.5) 27.4 (↓ 72.6) 0.1 (↓ 98.2) 99.5 94.8
ArcFace [9] VGGFace2 [4] 98.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 97.7
ArcFace [9]+adv. VGGFace2 [4] 3.1 (↓ 95.2) 5.5 (↓ 94.5) 63.8 (↓ 36.2) 0.1 (↓ 99.9) 99.5 97.2
ArcFace [9]+MTER VGGFace2 [4] 4.6 (↓ 93.7) 6.1 (↓ 93.9) 35.6 (↓ 64.4) 0.1 (↓ 99.9) 99.6 97.5
ArcFace [9] MS1M [53] 99.8 100.0 100.0 69.2 99.7 97.0
ArcFace [9]+adv. MS1M [53] 45.4 (↓ 54.4) 20.1 (↓ 79.9) 62.6 (↓ 37.4) 0.1 (↓ 69.1) 99.6 96.2
ArcFace [9]+MTER MS1M [53] 4.1 (↓ 95.7) 7.9 (↓ 92.1) 61.4 (↓ 38.6) 0.0 (↓ 69.2) 99.8 96.9
ArcFace [9]+MTER MS1M [53]+VGGFace2 [4] 9.6 (↓ 90.2) 6.2 (↓ 93.8) 19.5 (↓ 80.5) 0.1 (↓ 69.1) 99.5 96.8
Table 4. The average hit rate of models trained on CASIA-WebFace [54], VGGFace2 [4] and MS1M [53] supervised by ArcFace loss [9],
ArcFace [9]+adv., and ArcFace [9]+MTER, respectively. Attacks are launched from attackers to disguise targets in the feature level using
FFTGSM, IFTGSM, and in the label level using ITGSM [21]. The lower is the hit rate, the stronger is robustness of models.
Finally we introduce the label attacks settings. Although
the training identities are different from the test ones, we
could use the predicted identity of the targets as their labels
and let the attackers to launch attacks towards the predicted
labels. Meanwhile, a hit is defined as the predicted label of
an attacker is the same as that of the target. We also use the
average hit rate of the five targets to report the robustness
performance. ITGSM [21] will be used to generate label
attacks. We will not report result of FTGSM [21] attacks
because we find the this method often fails to attack face
models.
Results. The results of defense performance against fea-
ture and label level attacks are listed in Table 4. The hit
rates of original models are close to 100 percent under set-
tings where 13233 different attackers disguise targets. This
may indicate that the state-of-art face models are indeed
highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and an arbitrary
attackers would have high probability to disguise another
identity. While with our MTER method, the hit rate de-
crease significantly, which indicates that our method im-
prove the robustness of the state-of-art face models in both
open-set and close-set settings and prevent the face disguise
feature attacks to a certain degree. Besides, We discover
that the robust performance of our method on MS1M [53]
is less significant than that on CASIA-WebFace [54] and
VGGFace2 [4]. Therefore we recommend to use the large
datasets with less identities to finetune themodels with large
identities to get better robustness performance, e.g. fine-
tune the original model trained on MS1M [53] using VG-
GFace2 [4]. To further evaluate our method, we also com-
pare with a strong baseline by finetuning the original mod-
els and incorporating adversarial examples generated using
IFTGSM (5). The result shows that our method further ben-
efits from additional embedding regularization, which indi-
cates that incorporating adversarial examples in the training
process could improve robustness, while how to optimize
with them is also crucial.
The results of face recognition performance on original
models and robust models are shown in Table 5. We also
list the state-of-art models in face recognition community.
Training Method Training Set LFW YTF
DeepFace [43] 4M 97.35 91.4
FaceNet [36] 200M 99.63 95.1
VGG Face [33] 2.6M 98.95 97.3
DeepID2+ [41] 0.3M 99.47 93.2
Center Face [47] 0.7M 99.28 94.9
Noisy Softmax [6] WebFace+ 99.18 94.88
Triplet Loss [36] WebFace [54] 98.70 93.4
L-Softmax Loss [26] WebFace [54] 99.10 94.0
Softmax+Center Loss [47] WebFace [54] 99.05 94.4
SphereFace [25] WebFace [54] 99.42 95.0
CosFace [45] WebFace [54] 99.33 96.1
ArcFace [9] MS1MV2 (5.8M) 99.83 98.02
ArcFace [9] WebFace [54] 99.5 95.6
ArcFace [9]+adv. WebFace [54] 99.4 94.7
ArcFace [9]+MTER WebFace [54] 99.5 94.8
ArcFace [9] VGGFace2 [4] 99.7 97.7
ArcFace [9]+adv. VGGFace2 [4] 99.5 97.2
ArcFace [9]+MTER VGGFace2 [4] 99.6 97.5
ArcFace [9] MS1M [53] 99.7 97.0
ArcFace [9]+adv. MS1M [53] 99.6 96.2
ArcFace [9]+MTER MS1M [53] 99.8 96.9
ArcFace [9]+MTER MS1M [53]+VGGFace2 [4] 99.5 96.8
Table 5. The accuracy on LFW [18] and YTF [48]. The state-of-
art models in face recognition community are listed in the first cell.
Other cells are our models used in the face disguise experiment.
We could also observe that, the accuracy of robust models
on LFW [18] and YTF [48] decreased slightly, which indi-
cates that we may sacrifice a certain degree of recognition
performance for the improvement of adversarial robustness.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed a margin-based triplet embedding
regularization (MTER) method to improve the robust-
ness of DNNs. Experiments on MNIST [51], CASIA-
WebFace [54], VGGFace2 [4] andMS1M [53] have demon-
strated the effectiveness of ourmethod in simple object clas-
sification and deep face recognition.
6. Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.
61573068 and 61871052.
References
[1] M. Gunther A. Rozsa and T. E. Boult. Lots about attacking
deep features. In IJCB, 2017. 1
[2] Jimmy Ba and Rich Caruana. Do deep nets really need to be
deep? In NIPS, 2014. 2
[3] Mariusz Bojarski, Davide Del Testa, Daniel Dworakowski,
Bernhard Firner, Beat Flepp, Prasoon Goyal, Lawrence D.
Jackel, Mathew Monfort, Urs Muller, Jiakai Zhang, Xin
Zhang, Jake Zhao, and Karol Zieba. End to end learning
for self-driving cars. arXiv:1604.07316, 2016. 1
[4] Q. Cao, L. Shen, W. Xie, O. M. Parkhi, and A. Zisserman.
Vggface2: A dataset for recognising faces across pose and
age. In International Conference on Automatic Face and
Gesture Recognition, 2018. 2, 7, 8
[5] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial examples
are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. In
ACM Workshop, 2017. 1
[6] Binghui Chen, Weihong Deng, and Junping Du. Noisy soft-
max: Improving the generalization ability of dcnn via post-
poning the early softmax saturation. In CVPR, 2017. 8
[7] Yuheng Chen, Yuheng Chen, Xiaogang Wang, and Xi-
aoou Tang. Deep learning face representation by joint
identification-verification. In NIPS, 2014. 1
[8] F. Codevilla, M. Miiller, A. Lpez, V. Koltun, and A. Dosovit-
skiy. End-to-end driving via conditional imitation learning.
In ICRA, 2018. 1
[9] Jiankang Deng, Jia Guo, and Stefanos Zafeiriou. Arc-
face: Additive angular margin loss for deep face recognition.
CVPR, 2019. 1, 4, 7, 8
[10] Yinpeng Dong, Fangzhou Liao, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, Jun
Zhu, Xiaolin Hu, and Jianguo Li. Boosting adversarial at-
tacks with momentum. In Proceedings of the IEEE con-
ference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages
9185–9193, 2018. 1, 2
[11] Yinpeng Dong, Hang Su, Jun Zhu, and Fan Bao. Towards
interpretable deep neural networks by leveraging adversarial
examples. arXiv:1708.05493, 2017. 2
[12] Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernandes, Bo Li,
Amir Rahmati, Chaowei Xiao, Atul Prakash, Tadayoshi
Kohno, and Dawn Song. Robust physical-world attacks on
deep learning visual classification. In CVPR, 2018. 1, 2
[13] Akshay Agarwal Richa Singh Mayank Vatsa Gau-
rav Goswami, Nalini Ratha. Unravelling robustness of
deep learning based face recognition against adversarial
attacks. In AAAI, 2018. 2
[14] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy.
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In ICLR,
2015. 2, 4, 5, 6
[15] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun.
Deep residual learning for image recognition. In CVPR,
2016. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7
[16] Geoffrey Hinton, Oriol Vinyals, and Jeff Dean. Distilling the
knowledge in a neural network. arXiv:1503.02531, 2015. 2
[17] Jie Hu, Li Shen, and Gang Sun. Squeeze-and-excitation net-
works. arXiv:1709.01507, 2017. 1
[18] Gary B. Huang, Manu Ramesh, Tamara Berg, and Erik
Learned-Miller. Labeled faces in the wild: A database
for studying face recognition in unconstrained environ-
ments. Technical Report 07-49, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, October 2007. 7, 8
[19] Sergey Ioffe and Christian Szegedy. Batch normalization:
Accelerating deep network training by reducing internal co-
variate shift. arXiv:1502.03167, 2015. 7
[20] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton.
Imagenet classification with deep convolutional neural net-
works. In NIPS, 2012. 1
[21] Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Ad-
versarial examples in the physical world. In ICLRWorkshop,
2017. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8
[22] Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Ad-
versarial machine learning at scale. In ICLR, 2017. 1, 2, 4,
6
[23] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, and P. Haffner. Gradient-
based learning applied to document recognition. Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, November 1998. 5, 6
[24] Shan Li and Weihong Deng. Deep facial expression recog-
nition: A survey. arXiv:1804.08348, 2018. 1
[25] Weiyang Liu, Yandong Wen, Zhiding Yu, Ming Li, Bhiksha
Raj, and Le Song. Sphereface: Deep hypersphere embedding
for face recognition. In CVPR, 2017. 1, 8
[26] Weiyang Liu, Yandong Wen, Zhiding Yu, and Meng Yang.
Large-margin softmax loss for convolutional neural net-
works. In ICML, 2016. 8
[27] Jan Hendrik Metzen, Tim Genewein, Volker Fischer, and
Bastian Bischoff. On detecting adversarial perturbations. In
ICLR, 2017. 1, 2
[28] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, Omar
Fawzi, and Pascal Frossard. Universal adversarial perturba-
tions. In CVPR, 2017. 2
[29] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and
Pascal Frossard. Deepfool: A simple and accurate method
to fool deep neural networks. In CVPR, 2016. 2
[30] Taesik Na, Jong Hwan Ko, and Saibal Mukhopadhyay. Cas-
cade adversarial machine learning regularized with a unified
embedding. In ICLR, 2018. 2, 4, 5
[31] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B. Ce-
lik, and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks against deep
learning systems using adversarial examples. In ASIACCS,
2017. 1, 2
[32] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami.
Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations against
deep neural networks. In SP, 2016. 2
[33] Omkar M Parkhi, Andrea Vedaldi, Andrew Zisserman, et al.
Deep face recognition. In BMVC, 2015. 8
[34] Andrew Slavin Ross and Finale Doshi-Velez. Improving the
adversarial robustness and interpretability of deep neural net-
works by regularizing their input gradients. In AAAI, 2018.
4
[35] Sara Sabour, Yanshuai Cao, Fartash Faghri, and David J.
Fleet. Adversarial manipulation of deep representations. In
ICLR, 2016. 1, 3
[36] Florian Schroff, Dmitry Kalenichenko, and James Philbin.
Facenet: A unified embedding for face recognition and clus-
tering. In CVPR, 2015. 1, 8
[37] Mahmood Sharif, Sruti Bhagavatula, Lujo Bauer, and
Michael K. Reiter. Accessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy
attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition. In CCS, 2016. 2
[38] Karen Simonyan and Andrew Zisserman. Very deep
convolutional networks for large-scale image recognition.
arXiv:1409.1556, 2014. 1
[39] Qing Song, Yingqi Wu, and Lu Yang. Attacks on state-of-
the-art face recognition using attentional adversarial attack
generative network. arXiv:1811.12026, 2018. 1, 2
[40] Nitish Srivastava, Geoffrey Hinton, Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya
Sutskever, and Ruslan Salakhutdinov. Dropout: a simple
way to prevent neural networks from overfitting. Journal
of Machine Learning Research, 15(1):1929–1958, 2014. 7
[41] Yi Sun, Xiaogang Wang, and Xiaoou Tang. Deeply learned
face representations are sparse, selective, and robust. In
CVPR, 2015. 8
[42] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
and I. Goodfellow. Intriguing properties of neural networks.
In ICLR, 2014. 1, 2, 5
[43] Y. Taigman, M. Yang, M. Ranzato, and L. Wolf. Deepface:
Closing the gap to human-level performance in face verifica-
tion. In CVPR, 2014. 8
[44] Florian Tramer, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Dan
Boneh, and Patrick McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial train-
ing: Attacks and defenses. In ICLR, 2018. 1, 2
[45] Hao Wang, Yitong Wang, Zheng Zhou, Xing Ji, Dihong
Gong, Jingchao Zhou, Zhifeng Li, and Wei Liu. Cosface:
Large margin cosine loss for deep face recognition. InCVPR,
2018. 1, 8
[46] Mei Wang and Weihong Deng. Deep face recognition: A
survey. arXiv:1804.06655, 2018. 1
[47] Yandong Wen, Kaipeng Zhang, Zhifeng Li, and Yu Qiao. A
discriminative feature learning approach for deep face recog-
nition. In ECCV, 2016. 1, 8
[48] Lior Wolf, Tal Hassner, and Itay Maoz. Face recognition
in unconstrained videos with matched background similarity.
In CVPR, 2011. 7, 8
[49] Lei Wu, Zhanxing Zhu, Cheng Tai, and Weinan E. Under-
standing and enhancing the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples. arXiv:1802.09707, 2018. 2
[50] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi. Feature squeezing:
Detecting adversarial examples in deep neural networks. In
NDSS, 2018. 1, 2
[51] Y. Bengio Y. LeCun, L. Bottou and P. Haffner. Gradient-
based learning applied to document recognition. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, 1998. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8
[52] Ziang Yan, Yiwen Guo, and Changshui Zhang. Deep de-
fense: Training dnns with improved adversarial robustness.
In NIPS, 2018. 5
[53] YandongGuo, LeiZhang, YuxiaoHu, XiaodongHe, and Jian-
fengGao. Ms-celeb-1m: A dataset and benchmark for large-
scale face recognition. In ECCV, 2016. 2, 7, 8
[54] Dong Yi, Zhen Lei, Shengcai Liao, and Stan Z. Li. Learning
face representation from scratch. arXiv:1411.7923, 2014. 2,
7, 8
